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Abstract
Today’s cyber physical systems (CPS) are not well protected
against cyber attacks. Protected CPS often have holes in their
defense, due to the manual nature of today’s cyber security
design process. It is necessary to automate or semi-automate
the design and implementation of CPS to meet stringent cyber
security requirements (CSR), without sacrificing functional
performance, timing and cost constraints. Step one is deriv-
ing, for each CPS, the CSR that flow from the particular func-
tional design for that CPS. That is the task assumed by our
system, Deriving Cyber-security Requirements Yielding Pro-
tected Physical Systems - DCRYPPS. DCRYPPS applies Ar-
tificial Intelligence (AI) technologies, including planning and
model based diagnosis to an important area of cyber security.
Introduction
Embedded and cyber physical systems (CPS) are tremen-
dously important to our military, our nation and the world.
Most of our weapons and military support systems are CPS,
much of our critical infrastructure, such as the electric grid,
pipelines, and transportation systems are implemented as
CPS. The shift to digital control happened at the same
time as our nascent digital computing efforts, and happened
like the general computing developments, with little regard
for cyber security concerns. Our critical infrastructure and
weapons have always been vulnerable to physical attack, but
for such massive systems, physical distribution and the en-
ergy required to destroy or incapacitate them was itself a
kind of protection. However, cyber attacks can be inexpen-
sive, and networks can deliver those attacks throughout the
world very quickly. Cyber attacks taking control of CPS con-
trol systems have the ability to turn the CPS’s native power
against itself.
Current systems are vulnerable to attacks, which can lead
to catastrophic consequences in a military as well as civil en-
vironment. With the interconnectedness of CPS, such as au-
tomobiles, weapon systems and critical infrastructure, this is
already a huge problem. With the increasing penetration of
the Internet of Things, this will soon become an even bigger
challenge. A core deficiency in the current state of the art is
the lack of the internal ability to accurately detect the attack
and diagnose the corrupted state. Current computer systems
rely on external host or network intrusion detection systems
(IDS) to identify the incidence of intrusions. This approach
has a number of intrinsic limitations. Existing IDS can only
rely on target system’s generic monitoring capabilities, in-
stead of using the application, and system specific informa-
tion that might be available. Feature construction (e.g., sta-
tistical measures for anomaly detection, attack signatures for
misuse detection) has been a challenging issue. Without the
knowledge of the systems intended behavior at design time,
existing IDS systems rely on learning system run-time be-
haviors from audit data and extracting their patterns. With-
out application semantic context, this approach usually re-
sults in low detection accuracy and the inability to separate
meaningful program state from circumstantial operations.
Furthermore, the lack of application-specific information
forces the system administrators to rely on generic mitiga-
tion techniques which might end up doing more harm than
good. Consider the case where the functionality is critical
and real-time in nature. In this case, any reconfiguration that
takes longer than the task’s periodicity might result in se-
rious errors. Rather than complete reconfiguration, in this
case, a phased migration might be more appropriate wherein
an active replica is started and the state is transferred be-
fore the instance under attack is brought down. Today’s CPS
are mostly not well protected against cyber-only attacks, let
alone hybrid cyber-physical attacks. Those systems that are
internally protected often have holes in their defense, due to
the manual nature of today’s cyber security design process.
We seek to provide a research driven answer to the prob-
lem of how to automate or at least semi-automate the de-
sign and implementation of CPS to meet stringent cyber
security requirements, without sacrificing functional perfor-
mance, and timing and cost constraints. The first step in that
process is deriving, for each CPS, the cyber security require-
ments that flow from the particular functional design for
that CPS. That is the task that our system, Deriving Cyber-
security Requirements Yielding Protected Physical Systems
- DCRYPPS, takes on.
Figure 1 shows the architecture of the DCRYPPS system.
The center of the system is the Vanderbilt Generic Modeling
Environment (GME) (see (Le´deczi et al. 2001a), (Ledeczi et
al. 2001b), (Maroti and et al 2014)), which serves as a de-
sign environment, as well as a design tool integrator. Inputs
to GME include functional design models and requirements,
including constraints on information flow, for example. One
of the design and analysis tools that we have integrated with
Figure 1: DCRYPPS Architecture Diagram
GME is the DOLL Pamela modeling language, which sup-
ports probabilistic models of CPS, plant models, resources
and environments, as well as functional descriptions of CPS
behavior. A GME user creates a design, using the input mod-
els and requirements, and GME converts that model into
a Pamela model, which feeds an analysis tool that uses at-
tack/threat models and component reliability information to
drive a diagnosis based analysis of how to thwart the threats.
The outputs of the analysis are cyber security requirements
and probabilistic certificates, which are then fed to a con-
straint integrator. The constraint integrator provides options,
via GME, to allow the designer to modify the tool behavior,
for example, by adjusting the tradeoff between risk reduc-
tion and the complexity of the output requirements. Finally,
the cyber security requirements are delivered to system de-
signers and implementors responsible for producing a CPS
that meets cyber requirements, and well as functional per-
formance, timing and other constraints. This basic concept
of operations for DCRYPPS is shown in Figure 2.
DCRYPPS Innovations
DCRYPPS delivers significant and beneficial innovations,
including:
1. Use of model based diagnosis to derive cyber security
requirements from functional design models. Model
based diagnosis is a proven technology for diagnosing a
fault given an appropriate model of the system exhibiting
the fault. However, we combine model based diagnostic
technology with top down attack models in order to ex-
haustively map fault achieving threats. The resulting di-
agnoses are then used to generate cyber security require-
ments that, if satisfied, rule out that specific diagnosis.
2. Focus on cyber physical properties and cyber physical
attack models. Many attempts to formalize and prove cy-
ber security properties of systems have focused on infor-
Figure 2: DCRYPPS CONOPS Diagram
mation flow, which incorporates confidentiality and mod-
est portion of integrity. But unlike pure information sys-
tems, CPS are physically tied to the world, have poten-
tially dramatic physical effects, and vulnerable not only
to cyber attacks, but also physical and hybrid attacks. We
focus on attacks like sensor and actuator signal spoofing,
timing attacks and network attacks, where the most seri-
ous vulnerabilities of CPS are located.
3. Analysis of cyber requirements that is sensitive to risk
and cost tradeoffs. Although we can generate an exhaus-
tive list of faults, that doesn’t mean that we should gener-
ate an exhaustive list of cyber requirements. Our system
orders consideration of threats by likelihood and signifi-
cance of the effect of the threat. We can then tradeoff how
deeply we descend the list of threats, against the remain-
ing risk. We give system designers tools to explore this
design tradeoff space, and the ability to adjust cost and
likelihood metrics.
4. Use of probabilistic certificates in managing cyber se-
curity requirements. Probabilistic Certificate of Correct-
ness (PCC) is a metric used to capture risk in the engi-
neered systems development processes. We use the PCC
as a way of validating that the cyber requirements cover
the needs to avoid cyber attacks. To achieve the maximum
benefit from this approach it is important that a require-
ments verification process with a PCC metric is imple-
mented in a consistent way for all requirements.
DCRYPPS Technical Details
Building on Vanderbilt’s history in Cyber Physical Systems
(CPS), we leverage our tool GME / Meta-GME for initially
specifying the system. GME has had decades of use in both
designing CPS, and in accepting a variety of modeling lan-
guages and methodologies as inputs. One of our first tasks
was to integrate DOLL’s Pamela probabilistic modeling lan-
guage with GME, so models built or imported into GME
can be exported to Pamela, where they can be analyzed us-
ing Pamela’s suite of solvers.
We treat the derivation of cyber security requirements as a
kind of inverse diagnosis problem. We use attack and threat
models as guide for injecting faults into functional mod-
els, and use diagnostic reasoning to derive cyber security
requirements that can effectively block those specific diag-
noses. This combination of functional system models and
attack models was first explored in Shrobe’s MIT AWDRAT
Self Regenerative Systems project (Shrobe, Balzer, and et
al. 2006), and builds on prior model based diagnosis work
(Shrobe 2001), (Shrobe 2002), and (Davis et al. 1982). We
carry this approach further by using it not just to elaborate
attack models, but to actually derive cyber security require-
ments.
The inputs to the system are a functional model of CPS,
in a language such as AADL (see (Feiler, Lewis, and Vestal
2006), (Feiler, Gluch, and Hudak 2006)), SYSML (see (Ob-
ject Management Group 2012)), or other model based de-
sign language, along with a set of desirable properties that
designers believe must be maintained (invariants) even in
the face of cyber attacks. An additional input is the level
of confidence the designer want to have that the invariants
will hold.
Essentially, in this approach, we hypothesize various in-
variant violations that could occur, by negating each of the
desirable property invariants. We assert that the violation has
happened and we run diagnosis to generate possible causes.
Then for each cause, we ask of the component implicated if
various attack models are applicable to that component, and
if so, we generate a cyber requirement such that that com-
ponent be resilient against that attack model. Having added
that requirement, the component is deemed safe and hence
the problem must be elsewhere. We iterate through the pos-
sible causes in order of most likely first until we reach the
point where there are no more possibilities that are cyber;
hence in the end, the diagnosis will always be the failure of
a part due to non-cyber causes.
Given a risk target, we avoid descending too far down the
list of decreasingly low probability chain of possible require-
ments so as to manage the overall size of the cyber require-
ments list. We can also weight the acceptable risk based on
the importance of the function so that more cyber require-
ments are generated to protect the most important assets. We
keep track of the accumulated risk so that the generated cy-
ber requirements should be verifiable by an implementer to
produce a certificate within the acceptable risk specified.
Finally, we emit the accumulated cyber requirements
which essentially are constraints on the original system de-
sign.
Use Case
For a worked use case, we consider a simple autopilot for a
remotely piloted quadcopter.
The quadcopter is guided from a ground station using cel-
lular networking. The ground station can send new way-
points to the quadcopter but the quadcopter always has a
default plan to follow in case the communication with the
ground station is lost.
It does, however, require reliable navigation. For this rea-
son, the autopilot, whose job it is to follow waypoints un-
til landing at the final waypoint, has two different sensors, a
Figure 3: Auto pilot scenario.
Figure 4: A simple autopilot.
(Global Positioning System) GPS receiver which gives posi-
tion and altitude, and a VHF Omnidirectional Range (VOR)
sensor that gives directions towards a ground based transmit-
ter. With the aid of navigation maps that show the locations
of VOR transmitters, it is possible to navigate between VOR
transmitters. Figure 3 depicts a quadcopter en route from
Nantucket to Martha’s Vineyard.
The job of the autopilot is to follow the path between
waypoints. It uses sensors to determine position, it uses a
Kalman filter to estimate position, calculates an error term
and then calculates the appropriate control signals to feed
to the actuators (which are themselves simple controllers).
This is susceptible to all the types of attacks.
The command interface has a web server for use at the
ground station. Everything is controlled by the autopilot
controller board. All of of the sensors, the GPS and the VOR,
communicate with the controller board on a local network.
The VOR requires an interface that sets frequencies and di-
rections and the GPS has an interface that provides informa-
tion on satellites being received and position. The autopilot
has an up to date listing of all VORs in its operating region
but the GPS is the preferred sensor for a variety of reasons
that we won’t go in to here.
The model of the autopilot is shown in Figure 4. For sim-
plicity we have elided many details including the Kalman
filter algorithm used by the autopilot program to track po-
sition estimate independently for the two sensors VOR and
GPS. The controller board, C1 supports the autopilot pro-
gram, P1, which communicates with a local webserver W1
which in turn communicates with the ground station via the
cellular network, CN1, in order to communicate with the
ground station client. The two sensors VOR and GPS com-
municate with P1 over a local network. The autopilot pro-
gram continuously maintains an estimate of ’position’ using
its two sensors. It maintains also ’distance-from-trajectory’
which is an estimate of how close to the target trajectory
the quadcopter is at each moment. Other variables such as
’distance-to-next-waypoint’ are also maintained.
The designer also defines a set of propositions that define
what should not occur in the system, the invariant violations.
Some of these propositions can be proposed automatically
given the components being used, others are manually added
to by the designer to indicate what is essential.
Violation of invariants:
distance(V OR,GPS) >
MaximumSensorDisagreement
distance− from− trajectory >
MaximumOffTrajectory
...
(1)
Given this model, developed in GME or another system
design tool for which a plug in is available for GME, the
nature of all of the resources resides in resource models.
In this example we have standard parts, the GPS and VOR
sensors in the Hardware > Sensors > Navigation re-
source hierarchy, and the control board in the Hardware >
Computer > Controller resource hierarchy; the autopilot
program P1 and the web server are in Software > ... and so
on. Each resource model contains details of all aspects of the
component in terms of requirements for its proper function,
such as power and memory and also its cyber characteristics.
The structure of the system design, which is essentially an
attributed UML diagram, is translated by GME into Pamela
to enable the cyber requirement diagnosis. a rough sketch of
which is shown below.
;; Many details including inheritance
;; of resource attributes omitted
;; in this example for clarity.
(defpclass VOR [localnet]
...)
(defpclass GPS [localnet]
...)
(defpclass FlightControls [localnet]
...)
(defpclass ControllerBoard
[localnet cellnet]
:fields (pclass AutoPilotProgram
self localnet cellnet)
...)
(defpclass AutoPilotProgram [controller
localnet cellnet]
:fields (pclass webhost controller
localhost cellnet)
...)
(defpclass WebServer
[board localnet cellnet]
...)
(defpclass Network [...]
...)
(defpclass CellularNetwork [...]
...)
;;; This class wires components
(defpclass AutoPilotUnit []
:fields
:n2 (lvar ‘‘localnetwork’’)
:cn1 (lvar ‘‘internet’’)
:controlboard (lvar ‘‘cb’’)
:gps (pclass GPS :n2)
:vor (pclass VOR :n2)
:fc (pclass FlightControls :n2)
:localnet (pclass Network
:controlboard :n2 ...)
:cellnet (pclass CellularNetwork
:controlboard ...)
:controller (pclass :controlboard
:localnet :cellnet)
...)
Given the Pamela model, the cyber requirements gener-
ator invokes the diagnosis engine multiple times each time
asserting one or more violation in order to produce a list
of vulnerabilities. In this very simplified example, diagnosis
will be invoked in order on:
dist(V OR,GPS) > MaxSensorDisagreement (2)
distFromTraj > MaxOffTraj (3)
(dist(V OR,GPS) > MaxSensorDisagreement∧
distFromTraj > MaxOffTraj)
(4)
The diagnosis, which is described in the Section titled
Generating Cyber Requirements Through Diagnostic Anal-
ysis, uses the structural nature of the system model to iden-
tify parts that may be vulnerabilities that cause the violations
to occur. These things include normal failure as well as cy-
ber attack possibilities. Normal failure probability is deter-
mined by parameters of the resource model for the parts, and
cyber attack possibilities are generated from matching cyber
attack models to the violations and the components involved
in the system design that are connected to the violations in
question.
In this case, distFromTraj > MaxOffTraj impli-
cates in various degrees, the position sensors, the network
over which they communicate, and the autopilot program.
One of the vulnerabilities detected by the diagnosis en-
gine is a match with ’spoofing attack’. Different variations
of the spoofing attack are revealed: spoofing of the VOR
sensor and spoofing of the GPS sensor; and man-in-the-
middle attack on the flight controls is also identified. Each
of these cause cyber requirements to be generated for the
components involved in the identified attack vulnerabilities,
namely the auto pilot program itself, the local network, and
the cellular network.
Attack Modeling
We use cyber attack and threat modeling in order to assist
in driving the diagnostic analysis that examines components
and connections to track and eliminate faults. In particular,
an essential component of the proposed system is an attack
matcher which will be invoked by the vulnerability finder as
part of the cyber requirements generation. A database of at-
tack types will support potential matches against part of the
system design that is under review. It responds to the ques-
tion: given that an invariant violation has been asserted, is
there an attack type in the database that could result in that
violation? A match will result in a possible cyber require-
ment to present that attack from succeeding.
We begin by considering several scenarios that arise in
embedded control systems. In their simplest form, these con-
trol systems have four main elements:
1. A set of sensors, with analog signals that are converted
to digital form, collected in a data concentrator and then
transmitted to the control element
2. A network, that in modern systems transmits both sen-
sor data and control signals, using Ethernet cabling and
lower level protocols, but preserves the older MODBUS
or FIELDBUS application level protocols
3. The controller per se, that receives sensor data, estimates
the state of the system, compares the estimated state to
the desired state, and based on the difference between the
two, computes control signals that are transmitted to ac-
tuators
4. Actuators (or effectors) are digitally controlled devices
that, in response to the control signal, have physical ef-
fects on the system under control.
For the system to work correctly: sensor data must be cap-
tured and transmitted to the controller without modification;
the controller’s code must continue to accurately estimate
the system state and correctly compute the transfer func-
tion (state error to control signal); the control signal must
reach the actuators unchanged; the actuators must respond
correctly to the control signals; and each cycle from sensor
to controller to actuator must take place within a time inter-
val that depends on the physics of the system under control.
Beneath this level of abstraction, each of these actions are
carried out by computers: 1) Sensor data is captured by a
data concentrator, a specialized but usually programmable
computer. 2) The controller, often referred to as a Pro-
grammable Logic Controller (or PLC) is typically a pro-
grammable computer built around a micro-controller pro-
cessor (or even a standard MIPS or ARM chip). 3) All el-
ements interact with the network through a NIC (network
interface card), which is usually built from a SoC (system
on a chip). The firmware in these elements historically was
in ROM (i.e. unwritable), but in more modern systems the
firmware is kept in EEproms or other writable elements.
Finally, note that the controller unit is today implemented
as a standard computer, running a standard Real-time OS
with the PLC firmware running as a real-time process. In ad-
dition to the PLC firmware, most modern systems provide a
web server (usually Nginx or Apache) that provide the man-
agement interface to the system. Because, it is used as the
management system, the web server runs at a privilege level
that allows it to modify critical elements of the controller
system (including setting of process control parameters and
installing new control programs to be executed by the con-
troller).
Given this and attacker goals to, for example, disrupt the
system, we can derive a number of attack scenarios, below.
Sensor Data Spoofing If an attacker can modify all sen-
sor data that reaches the controller, then a perfectly correct
controller will issue actuator commands that can have dele-
terious effects. For example, imagine a temperature sensor
whose values are changed to read low. The controller will
respond by commanding the actuators to provide more heat
(say by increasing fuel or oxygen supply). Sensor spoofing
is a very pernicious form of attack since the controller’s only
perception of the real-world is via its sensors.
Sensor spoofing can be effected in either of two gen-
eral approaches: a) By penetrating the data concentrator and
then using it to systematically change the real sensor data to
spoofed data. b) By man-in-the-middle attacks on the net-
work linking the data concentrators to the controller.
Modification of the Control System’s Transfer Function
There are several ways an attacker can do this:
a) In systems where the management interface is provided
by a web server (or some other remote user interface) any of
the vulnerabilities of the web server might be exploited to
change control parameters or to download hacked versions
of the controller code (as was done in Stuxnet, although not
via a web interface).
b) There might be sensitivities in the controller code to
certain numeric values (or sequence of values) that can in-
duce numeric errors that lead to unintended control flows,
code injection, or code reuse attacks.
c) The controller maintains real-time network connections
to its data concentrators and to its supervisory and human
interface systems. If any of these network protocols can lead
to buffer overflows, then these can be exploited to inject code
or to conduct code-reuse attacks.
d) The controller runs an off the shelf real-time OS. If
this leaves certain ports open (e.g. FTP or Telnet) then the
attacker may be able to log in via a stolen or guessed pass-
word and then launch programs that can affect the controller
process.
Timing Attacks The sense-compute-actuate loop must
execute within the time constant of the system under con-
trol. Anything that the attacker can do to change the timing
can have disastrous effects.
1) Depending on the scheduler of the system, excessive
load placed on processes other than the controller can cause
the controller process to miss its deadline.
2) If it’s possible to initiate a remote login, then this can
be used to launch a large number of jobs. In the worst case,
these would be jobs with real-time requirements more de-
manding than that of the actual controller
3) The network can be saturated enough to make the sen-
sor to actuator loop take too long. This could be done with a
standard DDoS type of attack, although more subtle attacks
might well be possible.
Generating Cyber Requirements Through
Diagnostic Analysis
Given a model of the system that described all of the con-
nections, dataflows, compute elements, and other attributes
of the system design, we can use diagnosis (de Kleer and
Williams 1987) to find the cause of a fault. This technology
is useful for diagnosing faults at runtime, but it can be used
also to find possible causes for hypothetical failures of the
system at design time.
First of all, our model needs to represent failure of the
system, for whatever reason. A CPS can fail due to a hard-
ware failure such as a failed sensor. It can also fail because
of a cyber attack. These are often difficult to distinguish, but
our goal is to generate cyber requirements that render the
cyber attacks impossible. The resulting diagnosis will there-
fore generate system failures because the cyber possibilities
will have been handled by the cyber requirements.
A good abstract explanation of how diagnosis works, can
be found in (de Kleer and Williams 1987).
Violation implies that something has gone wrong. Some-
times this is because of a failed part, sometimes it can be
the result of a cyber attack. We can provide qualitative lev-
els of violation so that the more serious violations can be
given higher priority depending on what is demanded in the
probabilistic certificate.
Example of qualitative levels of failures may be: Catas-
trophic, Reduced Capability, and Annoyance.
The reverse diagnosis works by asserting that each one, in
turn, of the violations has occurred and then diagnosing the
fault. After all single fault cases have been diagnosed, dual
fault cases are iterated through and so on.
For each diagnosis step, the model is inspected to find
which parts could contribute to the failure. It generates a list
of possible reasons for the failure and rank orders them in
order of likelihood. Starting from the most likely causes, if
the cause is a cyber attack, a cyber requirement is gener-
ated and attached to the model component in question. That
cause from that component will never be listed as having this
vulnerability, so when we meet the same component from a
different diagnosis, it will not be listed as a cyber require-
ment candidate.
By enumerating the faults in order of likeliness and by
keeping the causes in order of likelihood, we can add the cy-
ber requirements in order of greatest impact. Given a speci-
fied acceptable risk, we can stop adding cyber requirements
when the acceptable risk level has been achieved by the cy-
ber requirements.
The values for likelihood and impact are computed using
the attack models and the system model.
The computation of the probabilities comes from rules in
the attack models for cyber related failures or in the com-
ponent models for failure rate based failures. In this case,
for example, a hardware failure, such as a faulty memory
chip in the control board could result in such a fault. For
the non cyber attack faults, the numbers can be estimated by
standard Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) testing, and
similar results can be obtained from software testing. These
numbers could be augmented by machine learning from in
situ data acquisition given the system model. In addition, the
probabilities of cause can be adjusted based on distance in
steps from the fault (Laddaga and Robertson 2013).
Probabilistic Certificates
Probabilistic Certificate of Correctness (PCC) (Van der
Velden et al. 2012) is the manner in which we will formally
encapsulate a model of cyber risk. The risk model estab-
lishes overall risk on the basis of hierarchical decomposition
of the design and thereby an accumulation of risk fragments
throughout the design.
The system definition is a connection of hierarchically
nested parts. This hierarchical decomposition enables the
calculation of a PCC for system requirements. PCC is a met-
ric used to capture risk in the engineered systems develop-
ment processes, in this case we use the PCC as a way of val-
idating that the cyber requirements cover the needs to avoid
cyber attacks. In a transitioned system, the PCC would in-
clude non cyber requirements as well and the PCC is easily
extendable to this, but for the purposes of this program we
will limit ourselves to cyber requirements. To achieve the
maximum benefit from this approach it is important that a
requirements verification process with a PCC metric is im-
plemented in a consistent way for all requirements. Our def-
inition of the PCC will include the following key elements:
1. Probability of satisfying the cyber requirements (Ps),
which gives the expected behavior as an estimated prob-
ability for a given confidence level (as a project risk pa-
rameter).
2. Confidence in the probability of satisfying cyber require-
ments, which gives a statistical confidence in the esti-
mated probability. Confidence relates to the likelihood of
a given component of the system being compromised with
an attack type given the provided safeguard against that
remedy. Each potential vulnerability of the system will be
analyzed and where appropriate constrained by a cyber
requirement.
Pamela
The Pamela language is a system modeling language that
supports reasoning over systems and machine learning of
probabilistic variables. Pamela builds upon a long history
in model-based programming.
The modeling of processes has a long tradition rooted in
pioneering work done at Xerox PARC (Kuhn and de Kleer
2010), NASA (Bernard et al. 1999a). The work has histor-
ically been used to support automated reasoning about sys-
tems and missions, to plan for mission implementations, and
to dispatch the resulting plans, monitor their progress, diag-
nose and track model state at run time. The success of these
models, developed over a period of 15 years, has lead to a
rich understanding of modeling languages. These languages
have typically been connected to reactive planners (Bernard
Figure 5: Pamela Architecture
et al. 1999b), diagnosis engines, temporal planners (Effin-
ger 2006), and dispatchers. These models have been com-
piled into specialized representations supporting specialized
solvers, such as Temporal Plan Networks (Kim, Williams,
and Abramson 2001) (TPN) for the temporal planner, Sim-
ple Temporal Networks (Muscettola, Morris, and Tsamardi-
nos 1998) for the dispatcher, and Probabilistic Hierarchical
Constraint Automata (Williams, Chung, and Gupta 2001)
for diagnosis. These specialized representations have in turn
been the focus of specialized algorithms with good perfor-
mance characteristics (Shah et al. 2007; Meuleau, Morris,
and Yorke-Smith 2008).
The most recent implementation of one of these
languages, Reactive Model-Based Programming Lan-
guage (Williams and Gupta 1999) (RMPL) comes at the tail
of a long history of programming language design for cap-
turing process algebras, most notably RAPS (Firby 1995),
and Esterel (Berry and Gonthier 1992).
Pamela is a language that supports the modeling pro-
cess to produce a generalized process model that can be
refined into a collection/composition of specialized mod-
els for which there exist specialized solvers. As a proba-
bilistic programming language, Pamela is back end agnos-
tic, and allows the programmer to specify his program in a
language that generalizes over the known ML landscape so
that the back end can reason about the best ML techniques
and solvers for the model and the available hardware.
Nature of the language The modeler frequently wants
to define nested complex objects with complex interaction.
Pamela is therefore an Object Oriented Domain Specific
Language (OODSL).
Pamela provides probabilistic variables, as well as state
variables, mode variables, finite domain variables, and dis-
tributions over each.
Pamela is an actively developed open source modeling
language that builds upon RMPL in many ways, but most
significantly by adding probabilistic variables, in situ data
collection, and availability as an open source project.
The general architecture of a model based program for a
cyber physical system in Pamela is shown in blue in Fig-
ure 5.
The plant, a CPS, a robot, a software system, or a con-
trollable device, is monitored by the model-based program
that uses observations and commands along with the model
of the system to predict modeled parts of its state. A con-
trol program in the context of the plant state causes com-
mands to be emitted that achieve desired states in the plant.
In DCRYPPS we use the model offline in order to reason
over cyber requirements of the system design, but it should
be noted that the same model used in the delivered system
can also monitor and track the cyber state of the system and
could be used for validation purposes.
The Pamela Learning Architecture adds learning, shown
in blue in Figure 5, and brings in support for data collection
and learning algorithms that can learn the bindings of the
probabilistic variables. Given that we are generating PCCs
as part of this effort, it is important to ask where the prob-
abilities come from. For the non cyber part of the system,
measuring the probabilities in real systems is an interest-
ing possibility and with the Pamela architecture, the in situ
learning of probabilistic variables could be used for accu-
rate probabilistic estimates. The situation for cyber attacks
is more complicated given that at any moment a new form
of attack could be invented. Since we are unable to reason
over attack types that have yet to be seen, we can only reason
over known attack models and measure the effectiveness of
the solutions in hosted systems.
Evaluation
DCRYPPS was evaluated on an autopilot architecture simi-
lar to the use case presented here. The autopilot model, im-
plemented in Pamela, was accompanied by a set of 17 de-
sirable properties. DCRYPPS generated five cyber physical
requirements. An independent evaluation team determined
that our five cyber requirements were necessary and suffi-
cient to protect the autopilot CPS given the agreed terms of
engagement.
The agreed upon terms of engagement were that the at-
tacker does not have physical access to the system at any
point in its life cycle; the attacker does not have ability to
modify the hardware or software during its development
or deployment; the attacker is assumed to have complete
knowledge of the system design, software, and its memory
layout; the attacker has remote access to the system through
the internet and radio.
Categories of desirable properties included: safety, sys-
tem protection, performance, regulations, resources and in-
formation security.
A selection of desirable properties that contributed to the
generation of output cyber requirements were three proper-
ties specifying that the absolute value of position discrepan-
cies between pairs of position sensors (VOR, GPS and iner-
tial navigation) be below specific threshholds.
An example output cyber requirement was:
WAN (Cellular) communication between Ground Station
and Autopilot should be authenticated using public key en-
cryption.
Conclusion and Further Work
Given a small scale formal model of a CPS, and a set of
desirable invariant properties, DCRYPPS was able to gener-
ate an adequate set of cyber requirements. Future work in-
cludes completing the development of PCCs to accompany
the generated requirements, and scaling up to larger CPS.
Also needed is the ability to read in and convert to Pamela
models represented in other modeling languages.
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